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ISSN:2394-3661 | Crossref DOI | SJIF: 5.138 | PIF: 3.854

International Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences

(An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Online and Print Journal)

The evolution game analysis of crowdfunding market financing supervision

( Volume 5 Issue 3,March 2018 ) OPEN ACCESS

Guoshun Ma, Yongfei Li


The rapid development of Internet crowdfunding market financing has brought great convenience to consumer investment. However, due to the information asymmetry between the initiator and the investee, there is a great risk of investment behavior. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, through the establishment of replicated dynamic equations, the dynamic evolution process of crowdfunding platform and sponsors' strategic choices is analyzed, and the evolutionary stability strategies of both sides of the game are obtained. The conclusion shows that the punishment of deception, the success rate of supervision on crowdfunding platforms, and the awareness of investing in rights protection are key factors affecting the crowdfunding market.

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